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Abstract
It is argued that Newtonian mass cannot be reduced to kinematical quantities—
distance, velocity and acceleration—without losing the explanatory and
predictive power of Newtonian Gravity.
Could mass be reduced to kinematical quantities—here defined as distances,
velocities, accelerations and higher-order time derivatives? This paper considers
the case-study of mass as it features in Newtonian Gravity (NG), where we will
not distinguish between gravitational and inertial mass, but take them to be
equivalent. I am interested in reducing mass within NG, rather than reducing
NG as a whole to a more fundamental theory and identifying a counterpart of
Newtonian mass in that reduced theory. I will argue that, in a sense to be
specified below, Newtonian mass is not so reducible to kinematical quantities.
One, modest motivation for this intra-theoretical reduction is the desidera-
tum of ontological parsimony. If a specific notion does no work—in some sense
to be further specified—at all, Ockham urges us to expunge it from our theory.
This is to be distinguished from the much more radical motivation that drives
many empiricists: the urge to get rid of all unobservables, regardless of any
other virtues they might have, such as explanatory power. It will become im-
portant later on that it is merely the more modest motivation—a methodological
principle that I believe everyone should apply, regardless of any sympathies for
empiricism—that drives the specific project of this paper1.
1Another, more specific motivation, under the general banner of ontological parsimony, is
worth mentioning. In the debate between comparativism and absolutism about mass (defined
below), the comparativist claims that absolute masses ‘do no work’ over and above the mass
ratios. Hence, it would be ontologically more parsimonious to get rid of them. As argued
elsewhere [1], the only comparativist arguments that have some chance at succeeding in fact
throw out (or risk throwing out) the massive baby with the bathwater: they eliminate mass
altogether, rather than merely the absolute mass scale. It therefore becomes interesting to
look at independent arguments against eliminating mass altogether, as is done in this paper.
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1 The Project
Why did we ever introduce mass in the first place? We cannot observe (a
particle having the property of having) mass as directly as, for instance, the
location of a massive object (relative to us). What we do observe however—pace
Barbour [2]—is that some trajectories (i.e. relative locations over time) do occur
in nature, say two celestial bodies approaching each other at ever increasing
speed, and other trajectories never occur, say two celestial bodies executing
the Argentinian tango. We postulate the primitive notion of mass because it
explains why certain patterns are allowed by nature and other patterns are
not. Mass therefore becomes indirectly observable. (Or so the standard story
goes. It is the aim of this paper to explore whether the same explanatory power
can be obtained without primitive masses.) More specifically, if we include the
values of the primitive masses in the initial state of our models of NG, and
postulate laws that refer to this notion of mass, it turns out that we can find
unique solutions to the corresponding initial value problems and thereby fix the
evolution of the system up to infinity. Including mass in our theory thus allows
us to 1) predict future states of the world based on past data. But not only
that. It turns out that in addition we can 2) explain the observed particle
trajectories. Why this is the case is most easily illustrated by showing why the
reductionist theory is lacking in this respect, as will be done in several places
below. In a nutshell, in the mass theory the initial variables and parameters
can take on all2 possible values, whereas the reductionist theory exhibits ad-hoc,
holistic, brute (i.e. unexplained! ) constraints on the initial values (which cannot
even be formulated without piggy-backing on the mass theory). Finally, if we
range over all the values the initial variables and parameters could take, and
solve the initial value problems for each of these cases, we obtain the correct3
set of empirically possible models. In other words, including mass gives us the
correct 3) counterfactuals and other modal claims of the Newtonian Theory
of Gravity. What more could we want from a physical theory?
The three virtues above provide a rough characterisation of the ‘work’ that
the notion of mass seems to do within our theory despite not being directly
observable (or more precisely, as directly observable as relative distances). If
we can show that kinematical quantities could do that work all by themselves,
then it was never really (i.e. fundamentally) the notion of mass which did all
that work (contrary to the standard story above), and we could and should get
rid of a primitive notion of mass on grounds of ontological parsimony. More
specifically, for our specific reductionist project to succeed, we would need to
purge mass from our initial state, leaving only kinematical quantities, and have
our laws refer only to those kinematical quantities. If the corresponding initial
value problems give the correct, unique solutions, we can 1) predict future data
2Except perhaps for negative mass values, but these can be made irrelevant if we take it as
a fundamental feature of the gravitational law that it is attractive and thus only cares about
the magnitudes of the masses. (See Jammer [3, Ch.4] for a historical overview of the search
for negative (gravitational) masses.)
3In the regime of applicability of the theory.
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using past data that is purely kinematical. Provided there are no unexplained
constraints on the initial data, we can also 2) explain the observed or allowed
particle trajectories. Finally, if we then range over all the possible initial kine-
matical states, and again get the correct set of empirically possible models, the
3) counterfactuals and other modal claims are also accounted for without having
invoked the notion of mass.
The most obvious way to proceed with this reductionist project seems to
be to find an operational definition of mass in terms of kinematical quantities.
We can then directly substitute4 the notion of mass in the initial state and the
laws with these kinematical quantities, and our work is done. Mach’s famous
operational definition of mass immediately springs to mind. Indeed, we will
shortly start our discussion with Mach. However, it is important to flag at this
point once more that Mach’s more radical, empiricist project is substantially
different from the more specific project just outlined, as will be discussed in
more detail below. Thus, although it would be imprudent not to start off our
discussion with Mach’s famous operational definition, Mach exegesis is not the
aim of this paper; as soon as our project diverges from his, we will leave Mach
behind.
Before moving on we need to make more explicit what was already implicit
in the previous story: how far do we want to go? One current strand of research
considers a moderate version of reducing mass. It considers taking some notion
of mass to be fundamental, namely the mass determinates—i.e. it is a matter
of fact whether two massive particles are equally massive or not—but aims to
derive its further quantitative structure—ordering5, metric6 and additive struc-
ture7—from for instance the dynamics8. Both the current and the Machian
project are interested in reducing mass altogether9, not merely its quantitative
structure. Keeping in mind the desideratum of ontological parsimony, it is sim-
ply not clear what work the fundamental mass determinates are still supposed
to do once their quantitative structure has already been reduced away.
In the next section I discuss a bad argument against reductionism by McK-
insey, Sugar & Suppes, before proceeding to Mach’s operational definition of
mass in Section 3. Section 4 treats historical responses to Mach, culminating
in my main argument against reductionism in Section 4.3. Section 5 responds
to two loopholes in the argument. The final section teases out a different line
of argument that has been looming in the background, resulting once more in
the conclusion that Newtonian mass is not reducible to kinematical quantities
without loss of explanatory and predictive power.
4Zanstra [4] adopts a similar ‘substitution approach’ in the analogous debate on relation-
alism about space.
5Whether a massive particle is less or more massive than another particle with a different
mass determinate.
6The ratio between the masses of two massive particles.
7How the mass of one massive particle compares to the combined mass of two other massive
particles.
8Dees [5] advocates a position like this. Perry [6] considers a more varied range of reduc-
tionist projects, including the Machian project.
9See also Esfeld & Deckert’s project [7] and my paper on regularity comparativism [8].
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2 A bad argument against reductionism
Before properly starting our main discussion with Mach in the next section, we
will quickly discuss and even more quickly dismiss a famous argument against re-
ducing mass to kinematical quantities. McKinsey, Sugar & Suppes [9] famously
provide an axiomatization of Newtonian mechanics in terms of the primitive no-
tions of mass, position and force. They point out that for mass to be reducible
it would have to be definable in terms of the other notions. Hence, it should be
impossible to find two distinct models of the theory which differ solely with re-
spect to the primitive mass, but not with respect to the other primitives. They
then claim to provide two such models: both models contain one particle only,
which is at rest at all times, and has zero force acting upon it, but the mass
values differ between the models.
As mentioned, we are here not interested in eliminating mass by reducing it
to an alternative unobservable, metaphysical primitive such as force. Neverthe-
less, if an axiomatization of Newtonian Gravity were to be provided in terms of
the primitives mass, position, velocity and acceleration, an analogous argument
to the one above might be generated. Presumably such a theory would include
two models each with one particle at eternal rest, but with different masses.
Both arguments deserve the same response. Although both models are in-
deed distinct (metaphysical) models of the theory, they fall in the same empirical
equivalence class—in both cases the particle is simply at rest and its property
of being massive is trivially irrelevant, observationally speaking. In so far as we
only care about models to the extent that they get the observables right, this
pair of models does not provide an interesting counter-example to reductionism.
A fortiori, the reductionist may insist that McKinsey, Sugar & Suppes’ ar-
gument backfires, since it seems to in fact work against the mass theory that it
acknowledges metaphysical distinctions that are empirically indistinguishable.
This violates the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (which is very similar
to our principle of ontological parsimony, i.e. Ockham’s razor). But this would
be an overreaction. It is not at all surprising that a property which is supposed
to manifest itself by influencing other particles is empirically idle or dormant in
a model where there are no other particles to interact with. What would count
against mass is if it were to have no observable consequences in any model of
the theory, or at least not in the model that represents the actual world. The
pair of models discussed in this section does nothing to support this stronger
claim.
3 Mach
Having put aside this argument against reductionism, we turn to the most fa-
mous positive attempt to reduce mass. Mach is well-known for providing the
first operational definition of inertial mass [10]. He vehemently opposed employ-
ing ‘hidden’ metaphysical notions such as mass in physics in order to explain
observable phenomena. The task of physics is merely the “abstract quantita-
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tive expression of facts” [10, p.502] concerning the relations between observable
phenomena. He defines inertial mass (relations) in terms of observable accel-
erations (or more correctly, acceleration relations) only, a feat that so inspired
the logical empiricists.
Consider two particles, which are either alone in the universe or approxi-
mately dynamically isolated from any other matter. If F12 is the force exerted
on particle 1 by particle 2, and F21 the force exerted on particle 2 by particle 1,
then Newton’s third law gives F12 = −F21. But Newton’s second law also gives
F12 = m1a12 and F21 = m2a21, where a12 denotes the acceleration of particle
1 due to particle 2, and vice versa. Combining this to eliminate the (directly)
unobservable notion of force, we obtain10:
m1
m2
= −a21
a12
. (1)
We have operationally defined the mass ratio of these two isolated particles, or
simply “named” [10, p.266] their acceleration relations as Mach would put it.
Of course our actual universe does not consist merely of (subsystems of)
two isolated particles. Perhaps we could manually approximately isolate such
systems (in turns) on the surface of the Earth where we dwell—or, since we can
never perfectly isolate any system from gravity, obtain the mass ratios via the
limit of a series of better and better isolated two-particle subsystems—but this
would not be an option when considering celestial objects [12]. It definitely will
not be an option in the generic messy, crowded worlds that we consider in this
paper11. This raises the important question of whether the previous procedure
can be consistently generalised to a larger system of interacting particles. Two
issues arise. Firstly, the operational definition depends on the component of
the acceleration of a particle that is induced by a single other particle, whereas
we only have empirical access to the total acceleration. In Section 4.1 we will
consider whether these individual components can be retrieved from the total
acceleration.
10Note that in general a21
a12
depends on the reference frame, although it will be constant
across inertial reference frames. Mach’s definition therefore also depends on the first law [3,
p.15], which provides the notion of an inertial frame. However, operationalising the inertial
frames brings with it its own problems. Pendse [11] proves that there exists an infinite set
of special non-inertial frames such that observers at rest with respect to those frames ob-
tain positive and constant values for the mass ratios via Mach’s operational definition, which
nevertheless differ from the corresponding values found in the inertial frames. Importantly,
those observers will not be able to tell that they are not in an isolated, inertial frame. Note
that these problems are irrelevant to the project in this paper: we take the initial kinemat-
ical quantities with respect to some inertial frame to be given, and use them to attempt to
calculate the emergent masses and the evolution of the system. The Machian project—“the
heuristic aspect” in Pendse’s terminology [11, p.55]—on the other hand starts out with ob-
served trajectories only, and needs to somehow reconstruct the inertial kinematical quantities
before one may derive the mass (ratios).
11Here I sympathise with Barbour’s warning not to be “misled by the special circumstances
of our existence. ... Take a billion of particles and let them swarm in confusion - that is the
reality of ‘home’ almost everywhere in the universe. The stars do seem to swarm... We must
master celestial [determination of mass ratios] and not be content with the short cuts that
can be taken on the Earth, for they hide the essence of the problem” [2, p.137-8].
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The second issue is prior to the first, since it arises even if we could (per
impossibile, in general) isolate each pair of particles (in turns). Consider a
universe with three or more particles. Step 1: take particle 1 and 2 away from
the other matter, such that they form an effectively isolated subsystem. Obtain
their mass ratio from the acceleration ratio via Mach’s protocol. Step 2: repeat
for particle 2 and 3. What can we now expect if we repeat this for particle 1
and 3? Will it satisfy the following consistency check:(
m1
m3
)
s3
=
(
m1
m2
)
s1
·
(
m2
m3
)
s2
, (2)
where si indicates the instance of the operational procedure (i.e. step) used to
determine that mass ratio? If absolute12 masses are primitive properties of the
particles, this condition is satisfied as a matter of logical neccesity . In Mach’s
framework, this equation is satisfied only if(
−a31
a13
)
s3
=
(
−a21
a12
)
s1
·
(
−a32
a23
)
s2
. (3)
But the accelerations which particle 1 and 2 induce in each other and which
particle 2 and 3 induce in each other place no (logical) constraints on the ac-
celerations which particle 1 and 3 induce in each other. Mach acknowledges
this. For him it is just a brute empirical fact that it does not matter which
particle we use as a standard to compare every other particle to; any standard
will provide the same mass ratios. But this is just another way of saying that
the reductionist assumes a highly mysterious and holistic fact without any ex-
planation whatsoever. A fact that is trivially explained—as a matter of logical
necessity!—if absolute masses are taken to be fundamental. We here encounter
the first loss of explanatory power for the reductionist.
If this empirical fact is nevertheless assumed, one can then proceed by chos-
ing one of the particles as the standard unit of mass, say 1kg or 1lb, in order to
fix all the other masses via the consistently determined mass ratios. (Note that
knowing the absolute accelerations would not by itself help to fix the absolute
masses.) Mass thus seems to have been reduced to acceleration relations.
3.1 Mach & Comparativism
Before evaluating Mach’s definition qua reductionist project, it is worthwhile
pointing out that this definition also makes him a comparativist about mass
(as opposed to an absolutist). Absolutism about mass is the view that the
most fundamental facts about material bodies vis-a`-vis their masses are facts
about which intrinsic masses they possess. Mass ratios are grounded in those
intrinsic masses. Comparativism, on the other hand, is the view that those most
fundamental facts are the mass ratios13 [15]. Absolute masses have no empirical
12For comparativism about mass—defined below—an analogous issue of consistency or tran-
sitivity arises, as discussed in [13, Ch.3].
13Mass relations, more generally. But I will follow Baker [14] in focusing on mass ratios.
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meaning; they are merely a convention. Thus, since Mach operationally defines
only mass ratios, if anything, and arrives at absolute quantities merely via a
convention, this makes him a comparativist.
Is any justification given for stopping at this point and not continuing to
provide a further operational definition of the intrinsic masses? Before respond-
ing to this question, it should be pointed out that the absolutist should rejoice
in Mach’s achievement, as far as it goes. The absolutist acknowledges mass
ratios of course, and has never claimed that masses (either the absolute masses
or mass ratios) are ‘directly observable’ (or more correctly, as directly observ-
able as relative distances). If mass were ‘directly observable’ the whole debate
between absolutism and comparativism would not exist in the first place—so
the absolutists always admitted the need for a method of measuring those mass
relations. And this can of course only be done via (more directly) observable,
kinematical notions, such as acceleration. Once we have this operational defini-
tion of mass ratios though, do we also need a further operational definition of
the absolute mass scale?
Since I have argued elsewhere in detail that Newtonian mass is absolute, let
me only briefly rehearse the core of that argument here [1, 13, 14]. Consider a
Newtonian world with two equally massive particles a distance r apart, with a
relative positive initial velocity v and zero angular momentum. How will this
world evolve?
Whereas this description corresponds to a unique choice of initial values
and parameters for the comparativist, the absolutist will demand that more
information is needed: this description is compatible with uncountably infinitely
many intrinsic masses. And, she claims, this choice is important, because for
some choices of intrinsic masses the particles will escape each other and for
other choices they will collide14—two evolutions that are obviously empirically
distinct—depending on whether the following inequality is satisfied:
v > ve =
√
2Gm
r
. (4)
It is clear from this inequality that the evolution depends on the initial intrinsic
masses of the particles, over and above their mass ratios. (Besides, once the
initial masses are fixed, the corresponding absolutist initial value problem has a
unique solution: absolutism is deterministic15.) The comparativist initial state
lacks the resources to distinguish between these two categories of evolutions,
with indeterminism between empirically distinct evolutions as a result. Absolute
masses are empirically relevant.
Could we supplement Mach’s project with an operational definition of the
absolute mass scale? It seems that attempting to do so would not violate the
spirit of the original project. The main thrust of the Machian project was the
14In the case of non-zero angular momentum, the set of solutions that features coinciding
particles is of measure zero. In that case we need to turn to the evolution of shapes/angles to
empirically distinguish the models, rather than coincidence.
15Modulo some well-known exotic counter-examples [16, 17].
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reduction of mass. Mach incorrectly interpreted ‘mass’ to refer to mass ratios
only. If we manage to additionally reduce the absolute mass scale, this would
complete the original project of reducing mass (now correctly understood as
both mass ratios and an absolute mass scale).
The obvious candidate for such an operational definition is exactly the escape
velocity scenario that was used to prove the empirical relevance of absolute
masses in the first place. The escape velocity inequality16 can be reformulated
in terms of kinematical quantities only: v2 > v2e = 2ar. This suggests that the
absolute mass scale could be defined in terms of some ratio of r, v and a17.
Although this seems unproblematic for the case of two particles, we will see
below (Section 5) that this does not in fact generalise to more particles.
4 Beyond Mach
4.1 Generalising to more particles
Let us now evaluate Mach’s project qua reductionism. Pendse famously points
out that Mach’s definition depends crucially on the simple two-particle scenario—
which initially seemed like a mere pedagogical simplification—and does not gen-
eralise to any number of particles [20]. Mach’s definition requires the separate
contributions induced by every other particle to the acceleration of a specific
particle, whereas we only have empirical access to the total acceleration of that
particular particle. In systems with too many particles the total acceleration
underdetermines the individual contributions. More specifically, Pendse argues
that, if we use only acceleration relations at one instant, the mass-ratios are not
uniquely determined for systems of more than four particles. Moreover, even
if we consider acceleration relations at any number of instants, systems with
more than seven particles will not give a unique set of mass ratios. I will briefly
outline the first argument here [3].
Let n be the number of particles. ak is the observed, induced total acceler-
ation of the kth body at t0, and uˆkj the unit vector in the direction from body
k to body j at t0. Then
ak =
n∑
j=1
akjuˆkj , (k = 1, . . . , n) (5)
where we solve for akj (akk = 0), the n(n− 1) unknown coefficients in 3n linear
equations, which represent the induced acceleration on particle k by particle
16This inequailty governs the special case where the mass ratio is one, but this could easily
be generalised
17We may call this a (spatiotemporally) local operational definition. See Martens [18] for an
(unsuccessful) attempt at a global definition, namely a reduction of the intrinsic masses to the
full 4D mosaic of particle trajectories (and perhaps their mass ratios). Dasgupta provides an
example of an alternative global definition. He introduces a notion of plural grounding, and
argues that the totality of kilogram facts is plurally grounded in the totality of mass ratios
[19].
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j at t0. It is these coefficients that Mach needs to fix the mass ratios. They
are uniquely determined only if their number does not exceed the number of
equations, n(n− 1) ≤ 3n, and this is not the case for systems with more than 4
particles. QED. The reader is referred to Pendse’s paper for the proof concerning
acceleration data at any number of instants.
4.2 Including other kinematical quantities
Narlikar responds by echoing the thought that underlies the suggested opera-
tional definition of the absolute mass scale: accelerations might be insufficient,
but we have other kinematical notions at our disposal [21]. In particular, we can
measure inter-particle distances as well as accelerations, and insert them into
the Gravitational Law18. Setting Newton’s constant to one for convenience,
we get the following equation for the (arbitrarily chosen19) x-component of the
acceleration of particle 1 due to the gravitational interaction of all the other
particles, at t0:
a1,x(t = t0) =
m2(x2 − x1)
r312
+
m3(x3 − x1)
r313
+ ...+
mn(xn − x1)
r31n
, (6)
where it is understood that the positions and distances are measured at t = t0
also. These, together with a1,x, can be observed, resulting in a linear equation
of the form
A12m2 +A13m3 + ...+A1nmn = X1, (7)
where only the m’s are unknown. Repeating this procedure for a total of (n−1)
different instants, we get (n − 1) (supposedly)20 linearly independent equa-
tions, allowing us to solve for m2,m3, ...mn. Observing in addition a single
acceleration-component of any of the other particles at t = t0 only is sufficient
to determine the remaining m1.
4.3 The main argument
It is here that we diverge from Mach’s project. Mach’s project was of a recon-
structive, descriptive and epistemological/empiricist nature. It is the project
of humans reconstructing (after the fact!) the masses from the appearance of
the four-dimensional mosaic generated by God21. Therefore, using kinematical
18Pendse [22] objects that we do not have independent empirical access to the Gravitational
Law. However, in the context of the project in this paper we simply take the laws as given.
In fact, Mach and Pendse’s own projects take Newton’s Laws as given, so why could Narlikar
not add the Gravitational Law to this?
19The arbitrariness of this choice will be discussed in Section 6.
20Although these equations may be linearly independent in general, presumably not all
specific instances will be so. What to do with those deviant cases? Perhaps it will turn out
that these specific systems are of measure zero in the space of solutions, and that that gives us
some reason to ignore them. Or perhaps these cases result in infinitely many solutions which
are all empirically equivalent. Or perhaps choosing a different set of instants to measure the
distances suffices to restore linear independence. All of this remains to be shown though.
21See Martens [18] for a discussion of reconstructing absolute masses using this approach.
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data at any number of instants is perfectly acceptable; we are here not in the
business of explaining part of the data (the future data) from other parts of
the data (the initial state). And this project had better work! We have been
applying Newtonian physics succesfully for over three centuries now. We have
modeled and predicted the behaviour of the planets in our solar system, based
on presumed knowledge of the masses of those planets. Thus, there had better
be some response to the potential problems with Narlikar’s argument as elabo-
rated upon in footnote 20, unless we want to invoke some error theory22 about
the way we have been doing Newtonian physics for the past three centuries.
In this paper we are however interested in the much more specific, meta-
physical project of explaining our actual world by deterministically generating
it from the initial conditions. That is, we are ‘playing God’, rather than recon-
structing some true, after-the-fact statements about God’s creation. Hence, we
are only allowed to use kinematical data at the initial time. The future data is
part of the explanandum, not the explanans. Using it would be explanatorily
circular. The tools used by Narlikar (and by Pendse when proving his second
claim) are not available in the context of this project23.
Does this mean that the reductionist project is doomed? No. We can retain
Narlikar’s insight—that we have more kinematical data at our disposal than
merely accelerations—but restrict ourselves to that additional data at the initial
time only.
If we could find an operational definition of the masses in terms of the initial
kinematical notions, then this would guarantee that these initial kinematical
notions would suffice (via some law which is obtained by substituting all ref-
erences to mass by its operational definition) to generate a unique evolution,
since this is guaranteed by the initial masses (plus distances positions and rel-
ative velocities). As we have seen that initial accelerations are insufficient, we
might follow Narlikar’s lead by including distances and inserting them into the
gravitational law. We start of with his Eq. 6 for the x-component of the acceler-
ation of particle 1 at t0, but instead of supplementing it with similar equations
at different instants, we consider the analogous equations for the other particles
at the same instant. For instance:
a2,x(t = t0) =
m1(x1 − x2)
r321
+
m3(x3 − x2)
r323
+
m4(x4 − x2)
r324
+ ...+
mn(xn − x2)
r32n
.
(8)
We obtain the matrix equation Gm = a, where G is the following n×n matrix:
G =

0 α12 · · · a1n
α21 0
...
...
. . .
...
αn1 · · · · · · 0
 (9)
22Beyond of course the obvious errors in the quantum and relativistic regimes.
23For similar reasons Schmidt’s reduction of mass [23, 3] is disqualified.
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where αij =
xj−xi
r3ij
. Since αij = −αji24, G is an antisymmetric matrix. But the
determinant of an antisymmetric matrix with odd dimensions is singular! Recall
that it is a property of the determinant that |G| = |GT | and | −G| = (−1)n|G|.
For an antisymmetric matrix (GT = −G) these properties combine to give
|G| = |GT | = | − G| = (−1)n|G|. For odd n then |G| = −|G| = 0. Since a
unique solution requires a non-zero determinant, this proves that there is no
unique solution of masses. QED.
4.4 Unpacking the argument
What exactly follows from this? If the determinant had been non-zero, then
reductionism would have been straightforwardly successful. It is less straight-
forward whether the vanishing of the determinant rules out reductionism. A
vanishing determinant (for systems with an odd number of particles) proves
that either there are no solutions or there are infinitely many solutions. Given
that standard Newtonian Gravity has some solutions, we know that there are at
least some sets of initial kinematical quantities that fall into the latter category.
Are there any sets that fall into the former?
Horn 1: No solutions
One might think that the following set of initial kinematical quantities does not
correspond to any (physical) solution. Consider a simple example of a system
consisting of three particles. Figure 1 depicts three collinear particles, with
the middle particle being one meter away from each of the outer particles. The
middle particle has zero acceleration, and the outer particles each an acceleration
of 1 m/s2 outwards. Since gravity is supposed to be attractive, one might think
that there are no mass solutions corresponding to this scenario, but there are in
fact two categories of (mathematical) solutions: one in which the middle particle
has a negative mass and the other two a positive mass, and vice versa. Although
there is in fact a solution, this seems ‘unphysical’, since standard NG with mass
includes the postulate that masses are always positive25. Standard NG thus
does not contain these types of solutions. What should we do with such ‘non-
physical’ solutions? Perhaps the reductionist could respond by claiming that
we can somehow throw away these mathematical solutions since they are non-
physical. We discuss such moves below. Instead I will now move on to a more
decisive example, where there are not even any mathematical solutions.
24This is true only because Newtonian Gravity contains both Newton’s third law and the
principle of equivalence of gravitational and inertial mass—without for instance the latter Eq. 6
would not have been as simple. This seems to suggest that if we were to go beyond Newtonian
Gravity by adding other forces which, for instance, do not obey a similar equivalence principle
(such as the Coulomb Force), the argument against reductionism would collapse. This cannot
be true however, since this would only introduce more unknowns (i.e. the electric charges)
without extra ‘knowns’ to determine those unknowns (unless perhaps the additional force
depended on velocity and we could measure the velocities to aid us).
25Or, that the gravitational law does not care about the sign of the masses.
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1m 1m
1 m/s2 1 m/s2
Figure 1: First example of a set of accelerations to which no (positive) mass
distribution corresponds.
1m 1m
1 m/s2 13 m/s21 m/s2
Figure 2: Second example of a set of accelerations to which no mass distribution
(either positive or negative) corresponds.
In the second example all accelerations are ‘inwards’, which seems prima
facie compatible with the attractive nature of gravity. In Figure 2 the two
particles on the left accelerate with 1 m/s2 to the right, and the third particle
accelerates in the opposite direction with 13 m/s2. It is easy to show that there
is no solution in terms of masses, not even negative masses.
Could the reductionist just choose to (a priori) rule out those deviant sets of
initial kinematical quantities? Especially Humeans about laws of nature might
be tempted by this approach. For instance, in the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis Best
Systems approach [24, 25] any true statement that is part of the best system
to axiomatise the data counts as a law. Thus, if the statement that rules out
these deviant sets of initial kinematical quantities is part of the best system, we
could just postulate it as a law of our reductionist theory. Compare this to the
Humean solution to the problem of the arrow of time: if the Past Hypothesis
(i.e. the claim that the initial entropy of the universe was sufficiently low [26])
forms part of the best sytem, this allows us to promote it to the status of law.
Apart from the standard complaints that such statements are not at all the
type of beast that we normally consider as a candidate for law-hood, it is impor-
tant that any such postulated constraint on the initial conditions is neither ad
hoc, nor unexplained. Moreover, this constraint should be formulatable without
(implicitly) referring to masses, that is without piggy-backing on the theory
that takes masses to be primitive26. There are several reasons to believe that
26Pooley [27, Ch.5.4] discusses analogous issues (concerning Sklar’s relationalist manoeuvre
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these conditions are not satisifed.
Whereas the restriction on entropy was straightforward—the initial entropy
had to be below a certain value—the restrictions that would rule out the deviant
set of initial kinematical quantities—or more specifically initial accelerations—
that do not correspond to any mass solution are much more complicated. In
fact, no value of initial acceleration for any individual particle is ruled out from
the start; the constraint takes on a holistic form instead. Only if a particle
is located ‘on the outside’, do we all of a sudden require that its acceleration
is not directed ‘outwards’. (Notice that this also holds for systems with an
even number of particles.) Similarly, once the initial accelerations of all but one
particle have been chosen, this can restrict the allowed values of the acceleration
of the ‘final’ particle (even if that particle was on the ‘inside’). Leaving out the
acceleration of a single particle from the initial conditions is not an option since
even when we do include this piece of acceleration the mass solutions are already
underdetermined in some cases (see below), nor would this solve the former
problem regarding outward accelerations. The choices of the initial accelerations
of a particle thus depend on the choices for the initial accelerations of the other
particles. It is as if the laws determine, after the fact, in a holistic sense, which
initial accelerations were allowed in the first place. Namely, exactly those that
correspond to initial masses. Inference to the best explanation suggests that
that is the case exactly because there are fundamental (initial) masses. There is
no non-ad-hoc, reductionist explanation for ruling out the deviant sets of initial
accelerations, especially not one that does not piggy-back on the concept of
mass. In contrast, these constraints are trivially explained (by the attractive
nature of gravity) if we do take masses to be primitive.
Horn 2: Infinite solutions
Let us turn to the sets of initial kinematical quantities that correspond to an
infinite set of solutions in terms of (initial) masses. These sets underdetermine
the masses, and since different masses correspond, in general, to different (meta-
physical) evolutions of the system, an initial state that contains only kinematical
data leads to an indeterministic evolution (if there is any well-defined evolution
in the first place). Such a reductionist theory will not provide the explanatory
and predictive power that NG with primitive masses does.
The first, most obvious line of responses consists of variations on the theme
that perhaps each set of infinite solutions is similar enough, in some sense, to
‘count as one’ and to therefore effectively form a single unique solution.
Variation 1: it might be the case that, even though each of these sets of ini-
tial kinematical quantities corresponds to several distinct possible sets of masses
each of which lead to metaphysically distinct evolutions, these respective dis-
tinct evolutions are in fact all empirically equivalent. If this is true for each set
of initial kinematical quantities that has multiple solutions, this would not only
save the reductionist project, but also prove (as was suggested once before, but
of adding primitive accelerations to the initial conditions) in the analogous substantivalism–
relationalism debate about space. See also Arntzenius [28, Ch.5.7] on piggy-back relationalism.
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Figure 3: The Smoking Gun: A numerical solution of the three-body problem
in one dimension (black trajectories), superimposed on an alternatve solution
(red trajectories). Each three-body problem has only been solved until the first
collision, as the theory breaks down at that point. The initial states of each
set of three particles are identical with respect to the kinematical quantities
(G = 1, d12 = d23 = 1, v1 = 0.2, v2 = 0.1, v3 = −0.5, a1 = 1.25, a2 = −1,
a3 = −1.5), but they differ in terms of their masses (mr1 = 5.5, mr2 = 0.125,
mr3 = 4.5; m
b
1 = m
b
2 = 1.2, m
b
3 = 0.2). Note that they do not only differ in
their intrinsic masses but also their mass ratios! These different sets of masses
generate empirically distinct evolutions! Particle 2 collides first with particle 3
within the red solution, but first with particle 1 within the black solution.
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incorrectly, in Section 2) that the mass theory recognises distinct metaphysi-
cally possible models that are empirically indistinguishable, which violates the
Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles and Ockham’s Razor.
Variation 2: Perhaps each set of infinite solutions consists of solutions that
differ only with respect to the intrinsic masses but not with respect to the mass
ratios. If so, the reductionist has at least partially succeeded by reducing the
mass ratios, if not the absolute masses.
The easiest, most conclusive way to kill both variations with one stone is by
providing a single counter-example to both. Figure 3 shows two superimposed
numerical solutions of the three-body problem in one dimension. The solutions
are generated from initial conditions that agree with respect to the kinematical
quantities, but disagree with respect to their initial masses (which in both cases
are compatible with the kinematical initial state) and moreover their mass ra-
tios (against variation 2). Both solutions clearly generate empirically distinct
evolutions (against variation 1), since in one case the middle particle collides
first with the particle on the left, and in the other case its first collision is with
the particle on the right27. Moreover, even if the mass ratios had been the same
in this example, it would have served to reiterate the point made in Section 3.1
that intrinsic masses make an empirical difference. Thus, it would make salient
that under variation 2 the need for fundamental intrinsic masses would remain,
which anyway provide the mass ratios for free, thereby making such a partial
reduction of the mass ratios good for nothing.
Secondly, the reductionist might suggest that including the ‘y’ and ‘z’ com-
ponents of the acceleration might serve to remove the underdetermination and
provide unique mass solutions. We should immediately feel uneasy about this
suggestion: when attempting to fix n mass degrees of freedom one would expect
to need n acceleration degrees of freedom, not an additional 2n more! More on
this below (Sections 5 & 6). But even when we do allow ourselves these extra
degrees of freedom, this move will not work. The one-dimensional case is still
a specific instance of the three-dimensional case. In scenarios were the ‘y’ and
‘z’ components of acceleration are zero, all components of acceleration together
still underdetermine the masses and thereby the evolution of the system.
Thirdly, the reductionist might bite the bullet and accept indeterminism (at
the initial time only). Perhaps there are alternative, reductionist laws which al-
low for several possible evolutions of the initial kinematical state—one for each
of the evolutions that correspond to the mass soultions compatible with that
initial kinematical state—but once a specific evolution has ‘begun’ it follows
through, deterministically, until the end. In other words, the laws are indeter-
ministic relative to the initial instantaneous state, but not relative to an initial
chunk of the evolution. At this point I can only respond by pointing out that the
onus is on the reductionist to provide such indeterministic laws that generate
27It might be argued that one cannot compare which particle is left or right of the middle
between different solutions. One could avoid this by adding an extra particle sufficently far
from these free particles to be dynamically isolated from them, in order to serve as a reference
for, say, ‘left’. However, the two solutions are clearly not each other’s mirror image, so adding
an extra reference particle is not really required.
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the correct set of empirically possible evolutions28. Even if successful, it seems
that such an approach would nevertheless weaken the predictive power of the
theory.
5 Bits and bobs
Have we ruled out that mass can be reduced to kinematical quantities? At least
two issues need to be dealt with before we can conclude so.
The main argument rests on the substantive premise that the number of par-
ticles n is odd. This may not be true of the actual world. Especially Humeans
about laws of nature might jump on this loophole, and just take the statement
that n is even to be part of the best reductionist system, which justifies pro-
moting it to the status of a law, thereby avoiding my main argument. However,
first of all, it just seems that such a statement is not at all the kind of statement
that is a candidate for being a law—why would it be nomologically necessary
that n is even? Secondly, it could well be false of the actual world that n is
even. Thirdly, even if n just happens to be even in the actual world, the reduc-
tionist still has to prove that Gm = a is solvable (where G is given by Eq. 9).
The attractive nature of gravity is enough to show that even in those worlds
there will be initial kinematical conditions that do not correspond to any set
of positive29 masses, namely those where the particles ‘on the outside’ have an
acceleration that points away from all the other matter. Fourthly, assuming a
non-revisionary reductionist—as suggested in Section 1—who wants to repro-
duce all the consequences of and the work being done by the standard form of
NG (i.e. with primitive masses), the reductionist theory needs to generate all the
empirically possible models of standard NG. This includes models with an odd
number of particles, even if none of those represents the actual world. Finally
and most importantly, the main argument still goes through for quasi-isolated
subsystems of an odd number of particles. Thus, even if our universe consisted
of an even number of particles, there will (probably) still be solar systems with
an odd number of celestial objects. (It would have been nice for my purposes if
that were true of our own solar system—ignoring asteroids etc.—but alas!)
Let us now turn to the last cluster of related issues. The focus in this paper
has mainly been on accelerations. Have we ruled out a reduction of mass to any
type or combination of types of kinematical quantities, or only a reduction to
accelerations (and distances)? We gain some insight into this question when we
return to the issue of operationally defining the absolute mass scale (Section 3.1;
assuming we would have been able to fix the mass ratios). Earlier I suggested
28Dasgputa [29] is developing an analogue of this project in response to the accusation that
relationalism about handedness, space and mass are all indeterministic. That case seems much
simpler though than the case considered in this paper.
29Although, for e.g. a system with four masses on the vertices of a square, all with acceler-
ations of equal magnitude pointing outwards along the diagonals, there is one unique solution
if we were to allow negative masses. (It consists of masses of equal magnitude (the exact value
depending on the acceleration magnitude), but the masses on one diagonal have a negative
sign, whereas the masses on the other diagonal have a positive sign.)
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that we could perhaps use the escape velocity scenario for this purpose. The
escape velocity inequality obeyed by that scenario can be rewritten in terms of
r, v and a only, suggesting that we define the absolute mass scale via some ratio
of r, v and a. However, Figure 3 has not only proven that mass ratios cannot be
reduced to accelerations (and distances), it also proves that the absolute mass
scale cannot be defined in terms of r, v and a once we have more than two
particles. For in that figure not only the initial distances and accelerations of
the two superimposed solutions agreed, but also the initial velocities. Thus, an
initial kinematical state containing kinematical quantities up till second order
fails to solve the reductionist project.
Could we include higher-order kinematical quantities? Since these cannot be
analytically determined from NG with primitive masses, it is difficult to answer
this question30, but since this would mean adding even more ‘degrees of freedom’
this does not seem to be a viable option (see also below). We are trying to reduce
n mass degrees of freedom to more than n kinematical quantities. These extra
quantities cannot be truly degrees of freedom; they cannot be independent of
the n degrees of freedom. Either they 1) will lead to inconsistencies in the
determination of the masses, or 2) they will always conspire to take on exactly
the right values as to avoid inconsistencies. Such a mysterious, conspiratorial
constraint—which presumably cannot even be formulated without referring to
mass31—would be totally unexplained, even if imposing this constraint on the
initial kinematical state would uniquely fix the evolution.
6 An additional argument against reductionism
As a little bonus, let us bring two earlier strands together, which inspire an
additional argument against the reductionist project. Strand 1: Pendse ap-
proached the reductionist project as a matter of counting degrees of freedom.
This aspect returned when we considered using the additional 2n degrees of
freedom of the ‘y’ and ‘z’ components of the accelerations to remove the under-
determination of the masses by the ‘x’ components of the accelerations (and the
distances) (Section 4.4). Strand 2: when considering ruling out deviant sets of
initial conditions that did not correspond to any mass solutions, we realised the
30Perhaps the following serves as a plausibility argument for an upper bound on the order
k of initial kinematical data that would guarantee removing the underdetermination of mass
(although the overdetermination problem, resulting in conspiratorial (i.e. unexplained!) con-
straints, still remains). On one popular view, the “at-at” theory of motion, (initial) velocities
are not in fact properties of an (initial) instant, but of an infinitesimal (initial) period of
time. After all, velocity is usually defined as lim
dt→0
r(t+dt)−r(t)
dt
, which is a property intrinsic
to [t, t+ dt]. In general, the initial kth-order time derivative of r is a property of [t0, t0 + kdt].
In a slogan: ‘God was not done when he created the initial configuration and the laws, but
he had to also specify the subsequent k − 1 configurations (depending on the order of initial
kinematical data that we are considering)’. Now, if k = n + 1, this initial period (of n + 1
instants) effectively contains n − 1 independent sets of accelerations (and even more sets of
distances). Narlikar’s method then guarantees that this initial data fixes the masses.
31See fn. 26.
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holistic and conspiratorial nature of the constraint on the allowed sets of initial
kinematical quantities (Section 4.4; see also the end of Section 5).
On reflection, it is quite strange that we were trying to reduce the n de-
grees of freedom of mass, a scalar, to acceleration, which—as a vector—has 3n
degrees of freedom, in the first place. We implicitly tried to avoid this awkward-
ness by only using one part of the acceleration degrees of freedom, say the ‘x’
components—cf. the one-dimensional solutions in Figure 3. However, especially
in the homogeneous Euclidean space in which Newtonian Gravity lives (pace
Knox [30]), it is arbitrary to use only one component of this vector quantity.
Even if we were to do so it would be even more arbitrary to determine exactly
which component we should use. We seem to have implicitly chosen some pre-
ferred axis, in a homogeneous space which has no structure to ground such a
notion.
Should we then have used all components of acceleration instead? We al-
ready mentioned that this, despite prima facie seeming to actually make the
reductionist project easier—surely more initial kinematical data will help to
further pinpoint the corresponding initial masses and remove the underdetermi-
nation—it actually is of no use: one-dimensional examples of underdetermina-
tion are just specific cases of three-dimensional examples of underdetermination.
In fact, adding these 2n degrees of freedom makes things worse. We expected
that, if the reductionist project had worked at all (contrary to the conclusion
of this paper), it would have fixed the n mass degrees of freedom via some set
of n kinematical degrees of freedom (plus the distances and velocities which
were needed additionally in the mass theory as well). If that had worked, the
additional 2n overdetermining degrees of freedom would either 1) have lead to
inconsistencies, or they would 2) have to always take on exactly the right values
to not lead to any inconsistencies. But this latter situation would be extremely
conspiratorial and unjustified32—as before in Sections 4.4 and 5. Except of
course for the mass theorist, who can trivially explain why the ‘y’ and ‘z’ com-
ponent of the accelerations always line up in a specific way ‘depending’ on the
‘x’ components.
Summarising, we should have been worried about reducing mass—a scalar—
to acceleration—a vector, from the start!
7 Conclusion
It has been argued that Newtonian mass cannot be reduced to kinematical
quantities—distance, velocity and acceleration—without losing the explanatory
and predictive power of Newtonian Gravity.
32See again fn. 26.
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